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To date, the relation between economics and physics has been analyzed through the 
influence of physics on economics. However, in the last years this relation has become 
more complex, because economic models are nowadays used in physics (minority game, 
GARCH model, etc.). The aim of this paper is to explain the origin of this new relation 
between physics and economics. It shows how mathematical analogies have contributed to 
progressively reshape the disciplinary boundaries of economics and physics, making them 
more permeable. It investigates three examples: Frisch’s “rocking horse” model (1933); 
the use of the Ising model for creating econophysics in the 1990s; the minority game, 
created by econophysicists in 1997 for solving an economic problem and nowadays used 
in physics. Our investigation demonstrates how mathematical analogies have started to 
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INTRODUCTION 
A number of historians and epistemologists of sciences and of economics have demonstrated how 
physics has deeply structured economics. Ménard (1978, 1989), Mirowski (1989), Schabas (1990), 
among others, have convincingly shown how, from the mid-19th century, authors such as Antoine-
Augustin Cournot, William S. Jevons or Léon Walras have initiated the construction of economics 
as a “social physics”. Their work opened the way to further studies that extensively highlighted the 
contributions of physics to the development of various branches of contemporary economic 
analysis: business cycle analysis (Boumans 2004, Le Gall 1994, 1999, Morgan 1990), general 
equilibrium analysis (Weintraub 1985), monetary economics (Morgan 1997), or financial 
economics (Jovanovic and Le Gall 2001a, Jovanovic and Schinckus 2017, Sornette 2014). Beyond 
these specific branches, a large part of 20th century economic methodology was also inspired by 
physics: mathematical economics (Weintraub 2002), economic modeling (Le Gall 2002, Morgan 
and Morrison 1999) or econometrics (Le Gall 1994, 2007, Louçã 2007, Morgan 1990). 
 
But should we consider definitive that the interrelations between economics and physics have gone 
from the latter to the former? Jovanovic, Mantegna, and Schinckus (2019) showed that during the 
last two decades a reciprocal movement occurred. Models and concepts from economics have 
contributed to develop several fields of physics. This result suggests that the relationship between 
the two disciplines is now more complex. 
 
This paper aims at shedding some light on the new interactions between economics and physics. It 
shows how some changes in the nature of analogies have gradually transformed the boundaries 
between economics and physics and the dynamic between these disciplines. Specifically, we extend 
Israel’s (1996) analysis of “mathematical analogies”. These latter are based on a mathematical 
model that is employed as an autonomous container usable for describing phenomena from various 
fields. Our investigation demonstrates that these analogies have generated autonomous 
mathematical models built with concepts and formalisms from both economics and physics and 
then applied for studying phenomena in each of these two disciplines. Such autonomous 
mathematical models explain why no single-direction relation between the two disciplines now 
exists and why the boundaries between both fields can evolve from both directions. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I will briefly review the major characteristics of 
analogies and analogical reasoning. On this basis, we will discuss the historical change in analogies 
with the emergence of “mathematical analogies” in the 20th century, as documented by Giorgio 
Israel. We will discuss and extend his analysis in order to capture some evolutions in the 
relationship between economics and physics. Section II will use these elements for studying two 
examples of mathematical analogies related with economics and physics: Ragnar Frisch’s “rocking 
horse” model (1933), which revolutionized economic modelling and business cycles analysis, and 
the Ising model developed in the 1920s and that played a key role in the creation of econophysics 
in the 1990s. It is worth clarifying that we will not discuss the economic contents of Frisch’s model, 
we will discuss the way this model was based on mathematical analogies. On the basis of these 
examples, we show that while mathematical analogies lead to dropping the restriction that the 
source domain has to be a mechanical phenomenon, the initial mathematical formalism is still here 
rooted in one source domain only: physics. Then section III will study one of the most recent uses 
of mathematical analogies in economics: the minority game. Our analysis points out a singular 
evolution of these analogies that occurred here. Mathematical analogies lead to dropping an 
additional restriction: the formal similarities do not have only physical meaning. As we will show, 
this evolution explain the important changes in the inferences between economics and physics and 
how they now flow in both directions. 
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I. THE NATURE AND THE CHANGING FOUNDATIONS OF ANALOGIES 
Analogies and analogical reasoning have been widely studied. Nevertheless, Israel’s work about 
the rise of “mathematical analogies” is less well-known, though it sheds light on important 
developments of sciences in the 20th century. This section presents and extends his work.  
 
I.1 The nature of analogical reasoning 
The usefulness of analogies and analogical reasoning in the production of scientific knowledge has 
been extensively analyzed (Bartha 2010, 2019, Norton 2018, chap. 4). Following Keynes (1921) 
and Hesse (1966), Bartha (2019, 1), who provided one of the clearest analyses, defines an analogy 
as “a comparison between two objects, or systems of objects, that highlights respects in which they 
are thought to be similar. Analogical reasoning is any type of thinking that relies upon an analogy”. 
Using Hesse’s (1966) terminology, the two objects which are compared belong respectively to a 
“source domain” and a “target domain”. Ménard (1989) offers a useful perspective on analogical 
reasoning by pointing out its dynamic process1. Among other things, he shows how analogical 
reasoning creates knowledge in the “target domain” by considering this domain as a virgin territory. 
 
Ménard (1989) conceived analogical reasoning as a three-step process. The first step is the 
“representation”, which consists in “circumscribing a relatively unknown territory” (Ménard 1989, 
86). The scale of this new “territory” does not matter. At one extreme, it can concern a new 
phenomenon within a discipline whose frontiers are already defined. At another extreme, it can 
concern a broader field of research that could later become a discipline or, at least, a new branch 
of an existing discipline. In all cases, the analogy has as its goal an apprehension of an “unknown” 
territory (the “target domain”) on the basis of an already structured and organized knowledge 
devised in the “source domain” (Ménard 1989, 87). The second step: the analogy provides “a 
structure for classification and in this new way it creates similarities and differences where none 
existed before” (Ménard 1989, 87). It is a creative process that consists in exploring the target 
domain from the source domain by creating in the latter similarities and differences from what we 
know in the former. One could say that the target domain is ‘modelled’ from known features that 
come from the source domain. This work is achieved through a binary analysis: we find in the 
target domain characteristics/elements of the source domain; we do not find in the target domain 
characteristics/elements of the source domain. When similarities are more important than 
differences, this can impel a transfer from the source to the target. In that case, and this is the third 
step, the analogy can authorize “circulation and transfers” (Ménard 1989, 89) from the source to 
the target. Such transfers may concern concepts, tools, or methods.  
 
I.2 The changing foundations of analogies through history 
Despite the rich literature on analogies and analogical reasoning, something was unappreciated in 
the literature: the changing foundations of analogies through time. Israel in La mathématisation du 
réel (1996) investigated such a historical and philosophical change, leading him to point out a 
singular evolution2. This author shows that this conceptual transformation arose through a shift, in 
his own words, between “mechanical analogies” and “mathematical analogies”. 
 
1 Ménard’s paper is the translation of a study written in French and published in 1981 in a two-volume book, Analogie 
et connaissance. This book is the sequel of interdisciplinary conferences on analogical reasoning held at the Collège 
de France.  
2 Giorgio Israel (1945-2015), trained in mathematics, was a historian and philosopher of sciences. This book, written 
in French and only translated into Italian, remains little known by English speaking scholars. 
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Israel explained that from the 17th century to the 19th century, “mechanical analogies” flourished. 
They were the product of a philosophical worldview, according to which the natural world and the 
social world would be organized and ruled by a small set of similar causal laws of a deterministic, 
mathematical and mechanical nature. From this perspective, mechanical analogies had physics for 
source domain and used causal schemes afforded by mechanics for explaining phenomena. These 
laws contribute to forming a natural order ruling the universe. Thus, 
 
“Science must offer a unitary and objective image of the Universe. Even if it is not possible 
to enclose the Universe in a single formula, the different parts of science and the theories that 
apply to different domains of phenomena must be at least linked together and coherent with 
each other. They must form a unitary construction, within which mechanics will always have 
the most important role” (Israel 1996, 18)3. 
 
The aim of scientists was then to unveil these mechanical laws at work in the natural and the social 
worlds. For this reason, a number of 19th century economists, who introduced the mathematical 
language into the discipline, analyzed economic phenomena through the prism of mechanics. For 
example, Cournot (trained in mechanics) explained that markets and machines would be analogous 
([1838] 1927, 9).4 He also claimed that economics was nothing but a “social physics” ([1872] 1973, 
325). In the same vein, for Walras, the “procedure [in economics] is rigorously identical to that of 
the two of the most advanced and uncontested physico-mathematical sciences: rational mechanics 
and celestial mechanics” (Walras 1909, 316)5. Cournot, Jevons, Jules Regnault6, Walras, Henry L. 
Moore, among others, intensively transferred to economics concepts, methods and laws from 
physics, explaining how economic phenomena would be analogous with natural phenomena. They 
supported such transfers by the hypothesis of a “single and unequivocal mathematical image of the 
reality” (Israel 1996, 11). 
 
However, according to Israel, the worldview that supported the use of “mechanical analogies” 
progressively collapsed from the beginning of the 20th century. The shape and nature of analogies 
used in economics and other sciences changed significantly, becoming dominated by 
“mathematical analogies”. In both cases, the nature of analogical reasoning follows the same 
process: both kinds of analogies establish correspondences between elements from a source domain 
and other ones from a target domain. However, a crucial change occurred with mathematical 
analogies: the “autonomization” of mathematical models. More precisely, the analogical reasoning 
allows one to use a mathematical model as “an empty container, which can be filled with different 
contents” (Israel 1996, 38). Such mathematical schemes “unify different but isomorphic ‘realities’” 
(Israel 1996, 75). In other words, we can consider that in the process of making a “mathematical 
analogy”, we have a multiplicity of target domains and one single source domain, the mathematical 
model itself. Indeed, we do not have direct transfers from the source domain to the target domain, 
as it was the case with mechanical analogies. The mathematical model becomes an intermediary 
between the disciplines, allowing bi-directional correspondences (i.e. bijections) between physics 
and economics (or between any other fields). Armatte and Dahan clarified: “This modeling is 
characterized by the priority given to the formal description over the phenomenon, the non-linearity 
 
3 All translations from the French are ours, except when specified otherwise. 
4 See Ménard (1978) and Le Gall (2007). 
5 Translation by Mirowski and Cook (1990, 208). 
6 On Regnault’s contributions to financial economics, see Jovanovic and Le Gall (2001a). 
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of the equations, the direct analogy between different domains, and the indirect verification (by 
simulation)” (2004, 248). In Israel’s analysis, these priorities justify the use of mathematical 
analogies. 
 
Let us detail one of the emblematic illustrations of the early mathematical analogies intensively 
discussed by Israel: the model of “relaxation oscillations”. These oscillations owe their name to the 
fact that “a fast decrease, almost abrupt, follows a slow increase, then the cycle is repeated” (Israel 
1996, 40). This model was designed by the Dutch physicist Balthasar Van Der Pol in 1926 in a 
specific field, electricity and radio applications. This author claimed that his model could simulate 
a large range of non-electric phenomena. This is a crucial point of his approach: this author was 
interested in the oscillations of the system, not in the functioning of the phenomena. In Van Der 
Pol’s perspective, his electrical model does not pretend to represent the mechanism of phenomena 
like the heart beating mechanism (one of his detailed example), but to simulate the behavior of the 
phenomena only. As he claimed, “the intimate resemblance of these phenomena, physically so 
dissimilar but mathematically analogous, cannot be denied” (Van Der Pol 1930, 255). He adds that 
“complicated systems, whose analytical solution would be difficult to obtain, can be solved 
experimentally in laboratories”. Further, from 1928 on, he explained that relaxation oscillations 
“are to be found in many realms of nature” (1940, 78). He afforded a list of phenomena that would 
obey them, including economic crises: 
 
“A pneumatic hammer, the scratching noise of a knife on a plate, the waving of a flag in the 
wind, the humming noise sometimes made by a water tap, the squeaking of a door, … the 
periodic reoccurrence of epidemics and of economical crises, … the sleeping of flowers, the 
periodic reoccurrence of showers behind a depression, the shivering from cold, the 
menstruation and finally the beating of the heart” (Van Der Pol and Van der Mark 1928, 765-
766). 
 
In the same vein, Van Der Pol ended a conference (Eindhoven, August 1939) with the following 
words: 
 
“Ladies and Gentlemen, 
I hope to have it made clear to you, how different sciences are often governed by common 
mathematical laws and relations, and how a clearer and deeper insight into some phenomena 
may give us a vivid picture of what happens in other apparently totally unrelated phenomena 
in fields belonging to other sciences so that often mathematics bind together what at first 
sight seems to be utterly unrelated” (Van Der Pol 1940, 87). 
 
In his view, the focus is put on the virtues of a mathematical model. His belief is based on two 
elements: a general mechanism (i.e. the relaxation oscillations) and the independency of the 
mathematical model regarding the phenomena at work in various domains that show oscillations.  
 
What are the foundations of such a belief? As Israel explains, the mathematical model used to 
explore the nature of various phenomena does not originate in the philosophical worldview that 
dominated during the 18th and 19th centuries. The world is now considered as complex and no 
longer ruled by a small set of general, simple and mechanical causal laws. Given the supposed 
complexity of the world, scientists nowadays use mathematical models as preliminary exploratory 
frames aiming at reproducing, mimicking or simulating phenomena, rather than providing causal 
relations that could explain the functioning of the phenomena. As Israel clarifies, 
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“The mathematical modelling is a conceptual probe that is immersed in the reality, and not 
the mathematical image of the nature (…). Mathematical models are the sensors of this 
probe” (Israel 1996, 330). 
 
Israel thus shows that “mathematical analogy” is based on the use of a mathematical model that 
could reproduce (via processes like calibration or parametrization) the behavior of a wide set of 
phenomena. It is important to note that the use of these analogies got rid of the causal schemes that 
were imposed by mechanical analogies: mathematical analogies are first engines for discovering 
regularities on the sole basis of reproduction. 
 
I.3 Mathematical analogies: questions and perspectives 
Israel’s analysis is very stimulating for understanding this historical change of the foundations of 
analogies. His analysis of mathematical analogies is mainly restricted to the 1930s, which he 
considered as the starting point of this movement. However, this movement can be traced back to 
1919 and happened progressively (Ginoux 2017). Indeed in the 1930s some characteristics of the 
mathematical analogies were not established yet. For instance, Van Der Pol did not drop the 
causality, while Bourbaki did in 1948. However, this dropping is a major characteristic of 
mathematical analogies. Given this, it seems necessary to extend Israel’s description of 
mathematical analogies. From this perspective, we identify three relevant elements. 
 
The first element: Israel did not point out that these analogies rose during the 1920s in the context 
of the “probabilistic revolution” (initiated by the birth of quantum theory). In fact, the transition 
from mechanical to mathematical analogies occurred in the context of modelling statistical 
ensembles where concepts of complexity and uncertainty play a major role7. As Bartha (2019, 
section 4.2.3) reminds us, 
 
“Steiner (1989, 1998) suggests that many of the analogies that played a major role in early 
twentieth-century physics count as “Pythagorean.” The term is meant to connote 
mathematical mysticism: a “Pythagorean” analogy is one founded on purely mathematical 
similarities that have no known physical basis at the time it is proposed. One example is 
Schrödinger’s use of analogy to “guess” the form of the relativistic wave equation. In 
Steiner’s view, Schrödinger’s reasoning relies upon manipulations and substitutions based 
on purely mathematical analogies”. 
 
The second element: Israel pointed out that mathematical analogies are based on the possibility to 
link directly isomorphic phenomena by a mathematical model. But he did not emphasize on the 
field (i.e. the source domain) from which this mathematical model is created. In his examples, 
physics is the only source domain of the mathematical model: Van Der Pol’s model of relaxation 
oscillations was created in the field of electricity physics, and Volterra’s prey-predator model was 
based on mechanical thinking (and also the introduction of a probability that predator and prey 
meet). In retrospect, this perspective seems too restrictive: various sciences can be considered as 
source domains of the mathematical model (economics, biology, geometry…). A telling example 
is the mathematical physicist Enzo Tonti. In 1972, this author explains that “many physical theories 
show formal similarities due to the existence of a common mathematical structure. This structure 
 
7 It is worth mentioning that Gingras (2015, 537) mentioned that “Philosophical reflections on the meaning of 
[mathematical] analogies in physics emerged only when mathematics came to play a central role in the construction of 
physical theories” and identified James Clerk Maxwell as the first author to raise this question in 1861. 
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is independent of the physical contents of the theory and can be found in classical, relativistic and 
quantum theories; for discrete and continuous systems” (Tonti 1972, 48). Tonti (1976) pointed out 
that these common mathematical properties derive from the fact that physical integral variables are 
naturally associated with the geometric elements of space (points, lines, surfaces and volumes) and 
time elements (instants and intervals). Relying on this observation, he provided an explanation of 
the analogies with physics: while physical phenomena have different physical meanings, they have 
in common the possibility of being associated with geometrical elements, allowing us to “construct 
a unique mathematical model for many physical theories” (Tonti 1976, 37). Thus, mathematical 
analogies can have a geometrical basis. However, it is worth noting that if a mathematical model 
allows direct mathematical analogies between isomorphic phenomena, then the model is 
independent of any domain and thus becomes an engine for isomorphism. Consequently, Ménard’s 
third step should disappear, and the mathematical model becomes in itself the new source domain. 
 
The third element concerns the lack of explanatory power of these analogies that Israel repeatedly 
denounced. Remember that priority is given, among other things, to the formal description over the 
phenomenon and to the indirect verification by simulation. The similarities between the two 
domains (i.e. Ménard’s second step) become the statistical regularities themselves. According to 
Israel (1996, 50), the mathematical analogies would be evaluated on the ability of the mathematical 
model to reproduce statistically a class of phenomena; and this evaluation would be based on 
criteria such as “likelihood and utility”. However, this alleged instrumentalist nature of 
“mathematical analogies” is too limited. The use of “mathematical analogies” can be positively 
understood as attempts to discover forms of order in the context of a new worldview dominated by 
complexity and uncertainty. Mathematical analogies can help scientists to explore phenomena in 
the target domains, independently from any causal scheme given a priori, but this does not imply 
that scientists will try to provide theoretical explanation to the new phenomena. In this perspective, 
it seems that mathematical analogies are linked with a phenomenological approach: we can 
simulate the phenomena without explaining them8. So, the theoretical explanation, if it occurs, will 
take place after the identification of empirical regularities. A telling example is Van Der Pol’s 
electrical model used for simulating the heart beating mechanism. More than 50 years later, 
Signorini and Di Bernardo (1998) showed that the heart beating mechanism is composed of two 
relaxation oscillations. 
 
These elements help us to see how mathematical analogies alone have changed the relationship 
between economics and physics, as the next sections will show. 
 
II. THE USES OF MATHEMATICAL ANALOGIES IN ECONOMICS 
Several examples illustrate the use of mathematical analogies in economics. We have selected two 
examples for analyzing the changes they have generated in the boundaries of economics and 
physics. 
 
II.1 Frisch’s rocking horse model: an early mathematical analogy in economics 
As we emphasized, the earliest uses of “mathematical analogies” occurred in the context of the 
probabilistic revolution. In economics, this period was crucial: this is the moment when 
econometrics and macroeconomic modelling arose. In the early 1930s, when econometrics was 
becoming an institutionalized field, with Ragnar Frisch in the cockpit, the study of business cycles 
was on the forefront. Frisch’s 1933 article on the “rocking horse” is one of the first attempts to 
 
8 On the phenomenological approach in physics, see Cartwright (1983). 
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explain economic fluctuations through the use of a mathematical model9. Frisch started his article 
by recalling the indebtedness of his model to the theory of oscillations:  
 
“The majority of the economic oscillations (…) seem to be explained most plausibly as free 
oscillations (…). The most important feature of the free oscillations is that the length of the 
cycles and the tendency towards dampening are determined by the intrinsic structure of the 
swinging system, while the intensity (the amplitude) of the fluctuations is determined 
primarily by the exterior impulse” (1933, 1). 
 
The rootedness of his model in the oscillation theory does not result from chance: when Frisch 
started working on this model from 1927 (Bjerkholt and Dupont-Kieffer 2009, Louça 2001, 29), a 
“new paradigm” had emerged in Europe with Van Der Pol’s work on relaxation oscillations 
(Petitgirard 2004, 433)10. 
 
With the introduction of relaxation oscillations in 1926, Van Der Pol’s non-linear oscillation model 
solved a problem on which physicists had been working on for several decades. At that time, France 
was a “crossroads” where various currents intersected and contributed to the development of a 
theory of non-linear oscillations (Ginoux 2017). One reason is that this new research was initiated 
by Henri Poincaré who established in 1908 that Van Der Pol’s equation admits a stable limit cycle 
type solution and therefore a periodic solution (Ginoux 2017, chap. 1). In the 1930s in France, 
research on oscillations was partly framed by Van der Pol’s “paradigm”, which explains why this 
author came regularly to France (Petitgirard 2004, 431)11. In 1930, the French physicist Philippe 
Le Corbeiller was assisting Van Der Pol at the Ecole Supérieure d’Electricité (Ginoux 2017, chap. 
6). He became “the contact and relay for Van der Pol’s work in France, when he did not travel there 
himself” (Petitgirard 2004, fn 1254). Le Corbeiller, who was working on a general “theory of 
oscillations”, as he called it, continued to popularize Van Der Pol’s relaxation oscillations and their 
applications. 
 
Several economists who worked on business cycles acknowledged the influence of Van Der Pol 
and Le Corbeiller. Goodwin is a telling example. As he explained, Le Corbeiller had a great 
influence on his work, in particular for stressing that nonlinearity was necessary for explaining how 
 
9 Louça (2007, 118-120) discussed some of Frisch’s positions from the perspective of Israel’s analysis. He compared 
for instance some key positions of Bourbaki (particularly causality) with Frisch’s ones, and concluded that Frisch’s 
approach was not compatible with the mathematical analogies. However, as section I explained, mathematical 
analogies evolved during the whole 20th Century. Remember that Van Der Pol did not drop the causality, while such 
a dropping is a major characteristic of mathematical analogies. 
10 We are working on an extensive demonstration of the link between the rocking horse model and the theory of 
oscillations (Ginoux, Jovanovic, and Le Gall 2020). Providing such analysis here would take us far from our current 
topic. 
11 Another reason for Van Der Pol regular presence in France is the connection with Poincaré’s work on self-sustained 
oscillations and limit cycles (Ginoux 2017). In other words, this research topic was extremely en vogue in France at 
this time. Moreover, Van Der Pol discovered Poincaré’s work thanks to Le Corbeiller. 
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macroeconomic oscillation could be a recurrent phenomenon (Goodwin 1951, 2). According to 
Goodwin, “Frisch misled a generation of investigators by resolving the problem [of explaining the 
continued existence of oscillations] with exogenous shocks, whereas already in the 1920s van der 
Pol had shown (as Frisch should have known) that a particular form of nonlinear theory was the 
appropriate solution. His solution leads to a limit cycle” (Goodwin 1990, 10)12. 
 
In his work, Frisch does not mention Van Der Pol or Le Corbeiller, while section 6 of his paper 
explicitly refers to “auto-maintained oscillations”, which are the general type of relaxation 
oscillations. In the early 1930s, at the time when his rocking horse was in gestation, Frisch knew 
these authors intimately13. We can mention five proofs, among several others that we investigated 
in another paper (Ginoux, Jovanovic, and Le Gall 2020). 
 
First, at the first Econometric Society meeting that held in September 1931 in Lausanne, Le 
Corbeiller presented his general theory of oscillations and explained how Van Der Pol’s model can 
be extended to economic crises and cycles14. Frisch was a participant in the session and discussed 
Le Corbeiller’s ideas. In this discussion Frisch presented orally some early ideas that he developed 
later in his impulse-propagation model (Bjerkholt 2015, 1163). 
 
Second, Frisch, as solo editor of Econometrica, accepted for publication in 1933 the paper Le 
Corbeiller presented in 1931. He claimed that “The problems of crises (…) is certainly one of the 
most difficult of Political Economy. In order to reach their solutions, it will be useful associate the 
resources of the theory of oscillations and those of economic theory” (1933, 328). 
 
Third, in the same vein, Frisch accepted for publication in 1934 a note of Ludwig Hamburger 
recalling that he was working between 1928 and 1931 on the application of Van Der Pol’s 
relaxation oscillations to economic cycles by using an analogical reasoning. Hamburger was invited 
by Lucien March to publish his study in French in 193115. These publications demonstrate that Van 
Der Pol and Le Corbeiller’s works were already being used by economists and statisticians 
interested in business cycles when Frisch was thinking about his model. 
 
Four, Frisch had a correspondence with Le Corbeiller and Hamburger16. Frisch and Hamburger 
exchanged four letters between 1930 and 1933. After the Lausanne meeting, Frisch and Le 
Corbeiller exchanged at least six letters between 1932 and 1937 (some letters are missing). 
 
Five, as Louça (2001, 32) has pointed out, in his correspondence with Schumpeter Frisch had 
integrated self-maintained oscillations into his analysis since June 1931. 
 
12 See also Zambelli (2007). 
13 Le Corbeiller was an influential members of the Econometric Society (Louçã 2007, 112). 
14 Regarding the correspondence between Frisch and François Divisia, it is probably Divisia who invited Le Corbeiller. 
Moreover, Divisia suggested to Frisch naming Volterra as a possible member for the Econometric Society. 




- 10 - 
 
 
The rootedness of Frisch’s model in the oscillation theory can be also observed in the title17, the 
vocabulary18, and more importantly in the structure of the article. Following the theory of 
oscillations discussed at this time, we know, and Frisch reminds us, that with a classical system 
(i.e. without self-maintained oscillations) the oscillations are damped due to frictions. To solve this 
problem, an exogenous source is needed to maintain the oscillations. This is the goal of the second 
step of Frisch’s article (section 5 of his paper): its originality was to introduce exogenous random 
shocks in order to fit with the observed data19.  
 
But an exogenous source is not enough for maintaining the oscillations of the system. The 
oscillations of the variables of the system taken as a whole must not cancel each other out (which 
would create a monotonic system without oscillating in the extreme case). Frisch solves this 
problem first (section 3 of his paper). For doing that, he introduced two hypotheses that were 
formerly discussed by economists. Firstly, a causality between the variables of the system: one 
variable (the capital/production) transmits its oscillations to the other variables. This causality 
ensures that the oscillations of each variable will not dampen the oscillations of the system as a 
whole. Secondly, it is a time-dependency in the variables that creates oscillations. 
 
Thanks to these two hypotheses, Frisch obtained a linear sustained oscillation model that can 
generate oscillations of a system conceived as purely abstract and general. But this model is still 
rough and it does not correctly mimic the reality. In order to have a model that fits with the 
observation, as Frisch clarified, a last step was needed. We have to “insert for the structural 
coefficients (…) numerical values that may in a rough way express the magnitudes which we would 
expect to find in actual economic life. At present I am only guessing very roughly at these 
parameters, but I believe that it will be possible by appropriate statistical methods to obtain more 
exact information about them. I think, indeed, that the statistical determination of such structural 
parameters will be one of the main objectives of the economic cycle analysis of the future” (Frisch 
1933, 15). In other words, Frisch clarifies the need for calibrating the parameters of his model. This 
is a characteristic of his approach. At that time, such a statistical estimation process was a pure 
novelty in the field of economics. This point is also interesting because simulation and calibration 
are intimacy linked with oscillation modelling (Petitgirard 2004, 425-9). Indeed, such a 
methodology validates the mathematical analogy by identifying similitudes, which are statistical 
regularities, between the phenomena from different disciplines.  
 
The “rocking horse” model shares many characteristics of a mathematical analogy approach. Based 
on the explanations given in section I, it is worth mentioning that we can use a mathematical model 
within a set of mechanical analogies. In this case, the mathematical model will be used for 
determining causal relations in the target field. This is not the case with mathematical analogies 
and with Van Der Pol’s nonlinear model. But Frisch couldn’t solve a nonlinear system at his time. 
He couldn’t investigate this avenue with his mathematical model. However, simulation, calibration, 
auto-maintained oscillations (section 6 of his paper), or his ex post explanations (sections 4, 5 and 
 
17 The terms “impulse” and “propagation” are used in oscillation theory. 
18 Frisch (1933) used the words “economic oscillations” whereas most economists at that time used the words 
“economic cycles”. 
19 The introduction of such shocks was a first step toward the “probabilistic revolution” that fully occurred in 
econometrics with Haavelmo (1944). 
- 11 - 
 
6) are relevant elements of a mathematical analogy approach. In other words, although Frisch did 
not develop a nonlinear model like Van Der Pol, his conception is embedded in the mathematical 
analogy approach. This conclusion is also shared by Armatte and Dahan (2004, 252) who claimed 
that “the form of the model used by (…) Ragnar Frisch (...) is inspired by small oscillator models 
[and] directly derived from the practice of mathematical engineers, notably Van der Pol, who was 
in close touch with these econometricians (...). The reference to economic theory has faded away 
and only remains as the idea of a dynamic with delays between investment and production, between 
income and consumption. The ambition is clearly to build a small mechanism that can, for certain 
values of its parameters, simulate an economic mechanism, behave like an economic system”. We 
view this model as based on mathematical analogy and consider it as one of the first examples in 
economics. 
 
II.2 The Ising model: a mathematical analogy that gave birth to econophysics 
Our second example of the influence of mathematical analogies on boundaries between economics 
and physics concerns econophysics20. The term econophysics refers to the extension of methods, 
models and concepts traditionally introduced and developed in the field of statistical and theoretical 
physics to the study of problems commonly considered to fall within the sphere of economics. The 
first use in print of the neologism “econophysics” occurred in a 1996 article by Stanley et al. (1996). 
In this seminal article, they claimed that “the analogy between economics and critical phenomena 
[described by the Ising model] is sufficiently strong that a similar story might evolve” (1996, 
316)21. The Ising model, invented in 1920, was indeed crucial in the construction of econophysics 
(Jovanovic and Schinckus 2017, Schinckus 2018, Sornette 2014)22. 
 
 
20 The birth and the early development of econophysics is today well-known (Jovanovic and Schinckus 2013a, b, 
Kutner et al. 2019). Over the past two decades, econophysics has carved out a place in the scientific analysis of financial 
markets, macroeconomics, international economics, market microstructure, labor productivity, etc., providing new 
theoretical models, methods, and results (Aoyama et al. 2017, Gabaix 2009, Jovanovic and Schinckus 2017, Potters 
and Bouchaud 2003). 
21 A critical phenomenon is a phenomenon for which the passage from one phase to another one is continuous. At the 
critical point, the system appears the same at all scales of analysis. This property is called “scale invariance,” which 
means that no matter how closely one looks, one sees the same properties. The dynamics of critical states can be 
characterized by a power law that deserves special attention, because this law is a key element in econophysics’ 
literature. 
See Jovanovic and Schinckus (2017, chap. 3) for an extended definition of phase transitions and critical point in 
economic words.  
22 The Ising model was invented by the physicist Wilhelm Lenz in 1920, and named after one of his PhD students Ernst 
Ising, solved it in 1925. It worth remembering that the Van Der Pol and Volterra models were created in the same 
decade. 
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Briefly, the Ising model consists of discrete variables that represent magnetic moments of atomic 
spins that can take one of two states, +1 (“up”) or −1 (“down”), the two states referring to the 
direction taken by the spins. The concept of spin characterizes the circular movement of particles 
(electrons, positrons, protons, etc.) implying that they have a specific rotation. There is no way to 
speed up or slow down the spin of an electron, but its direction can be changed, as modelled by the 
Ising model. The interesting point is that the direction of one spin directly influences the direction 
of its neighbor’s spins. This influence can be captured through a function of correlation that 
measures to what extent the behaviors of spins are correlated. The major idea of the Ising model is 
how to describe this interaction between particles’ spins. From this perspective, the spins are 
arranged in a graph, usually a lattice. The spin’s influence is measured by the distance over which 
the direction of one spin affects the direction of its neighbor’s spins. This distance is called the 
correlation length; it has an important function in the identification of critical phenomena. Indeed, 
the correlation length measures the distance over which the behavior of one microscopic variable 
is influenced by the behavior of another. Away from the critical point (at low temperatures), the 
spins point in the same direction. In such a situation, the thermal energy is too low to play a role; 
the direction of each spin depends only on its immediate neighbors making the correlation length 
finite. But at the critical point, when the temperature has been increased to reach the critical 
temperature, the situation is completely different. The spins no longer point in the same direction 
because the thermal energy dominates the whole system and the magnetization spin-spin vanishes. 
In this critical situation, spins point in no specific direction and follow a stochastic distribution. 
Moreover, each spin is now influenced by all other spins (not only its neighbors) whatever their 
distance. This situation is a particular configuration in which the correlation length is very 
important (it is considered to be infinite). At this critical state, the whole system appears to be in 
homogeneous configuration characterized by this infinite correlation length making the system 
scale invariant. Consequently, the spin system has the same physical properties whatever the scale 
length considered. It is worth mentioning that large variation correlation length appears to be ruled 
by a power-law, which is a key element of most of econophysics models23. 
 
The Ising model is a perfect illustration of the autonomous nature of mathematical model used as 
an empty container that characterize the mathematical analogies. Precisely, at the origin, it is a 
mathematical model of ferromagnetism used to study phase transitions and critical points. 
However, “it ‘possesses no ferromagnetic properties’” (Hughes 1999, 104). Its abstract and general 
structure permits its use to the study many other problems or phenomena characterized by phase 
transitions and critical points: 
 
“The Ising model is employed in a variety of ways in the study of critical point phenomena. 
To recapitulate, Ising proposed it (…) as a model of ferromagnetism; subsequently it has 
been used to model, for example, liquid-vapour transitions and the behaviour of binary alloys. 
Each of these interpretations of the model is in terms of a specific example of critical point 
behavior (…). [T]he model also casts light on critical point behaviour in general. Likewise, 
 
23 A power-law distribution is a special kind of probability distribution, such as 𝑝(𝑥) = 𝐶𝑥!". Such distribution is 
leptokurtic, and it is widely used for studying variables that have extreme values. In economics, a well-known power 
law is the Pareto law. The main property of power laws is their scale invariance. Moreover, from the viewpoint of 
statistical physicists, power laws are synonymous with complex systems, which makes their study particularly 
valuable. 
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the pictures generated by computer simulation of the model’s behaviour illustrate (…) the 
whole field of scale-invariant properties” (Hughes 1999, 124-125). 
 
For these reasons, the Ising model is considered as the simplest description of a system with a 
critical point; it has played a central role in the development of research on critical phenomena 
(Jovanovic and Schinckus 2017, Sornette 2014). Moreover, the use of the Ising model is not 
restricted to statistical physics because “the specification of the model has no specific physical 
content” (Hughes 1999, 99); its content is mathematical. Therefore, as section I explained, while 
this model came from physics, it is independent of the underlying phenomenon studied, and it can 
be used to analyze any phenomena that share the same mathematical characteristics. In other words, 
the Ising model is a telling example of a mathematical model used in the process of mathematical 
analogies, which has allowed the transfers from physics to economics. 
 
How did statistical physicists proceed? As Jovanovic and Schinckus (2017, chap. 3) explained, 
statistical physicists adopt a phenomenological methodology. They identified phenomena with 
large numbers of interacting units whose microscopic behaviors could not be observed directly but 
which can generate observable macroscopic results. Therefore, modelers can look for statistical 
regularities often characterized by power laws, which are the main mathematical characteristic of 
critical phenomena, and also the main elements for justifying the application of statistical physics 
models, like the Ising model, to new phenomena and new target domains. As section I explained 
regarding the process of mathematical analogies, we have one mathematical model, which is the 
source domain and an empty container, and with a multiplicity of target domains. Moreover, it is 
worth saying that the process of identification used during this application of mathematical 
analogies is similar to Ménard’s second step: the target domain is "modelled" by the analogical 
reasoning. For instance, any work in econophysics advances empirical results to demonstrate that 
the phenomena studied are ruled by a distribution of variables or observables following a power 
law scaling, then varies (i.e. calibrate) the parameter α of the power laws until they obtain the best 
fit between the graph of the power law and the one describing the empirical data24. However, power 
laws can visually be close to so-called exponential laws, and it is extremely difficult to distinguish 
between them25. Therefore, this process of identifying a power law in the target domain is a telling 
illustration of how the domain source creates similarities in the target domain. At this stage, in the 
early works in econophysics, the mathematical analogies are similar to what we observed with 
Frisch: we have one source domain (i.e. physics) for the mathematical model.  
 
To conclude this section, Frisch’s model and the Ising model illustrate the diffusion of the use of 
mathematical analogies for studying economic phenomena. In accordance with Israel’s analysis, 
these analogies drop the restriction that the source domain has to be mechanics or physical 
mechanics and its underlying causalities. However, the mathematical model used in the analogical 
process still has a physical meaning. Indeed, in the case of the oscillator, the formalism is 
mathematical, but there is a physical basis. It is similar with the Ising model. In other words, physics 
remains a justification for the use of mathematical analogies. However, as the next section will 
detail, the econophysicists’ approach has progressively transformed the mathematical analogies, 
changing the boundaries between economics and physics. 
 
24 In the same vein, econophysicists introduced truncation techniques for power laws in order to fit the observations 
of the target domain with their mathematical model (Jovanovic and Schinckus 2017, chap. 3). 
25 In fact, many of the power laws econophysicists been trying to explain are not power laws at all (Clauset, Shalizi, 
and Newman 2009). 
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III. MATHEMATICAL ANALOGIES: ENGINES FOR CHANGING THE 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PHYSICS 
The last step of our analysis exposes the new interactions and avenues that emerge with 
econophysics. Jovanovic, Mantegna, and Schinckus (2019) showed that some models developed 
by econophysics are today being brought back into physics. They analyzed three illustrations of 
such transfers from economics to physics: the modelling of out of equilibrium processes, signal 
detection in multivariate systems and information process and aggregation in multi-agent physical 
systems. In our opinion, such transfers between the two disciplines were clearly allowed by 
mathematical analogies. A telling illustration of the way mathematical analogies create an 
opportunity to use an economic model for solving physical issues and show the evolution in 
mathematical analogies is the so-called “minority game”. 
 
III.1 Minority game: new flow between physics and economics 
Minority game was created mainly by two econophysicists, Challet and Zhang (1997). It is a 
stylized version of the “El Farol bar” problem. This is a well-known problem in game theory, 
originally introduced by an economist, W. Brian Arthur in 1994. At the 1994 AEA annual meeting, 
this author presented the following problem. N agents decide independently each week whether to 
go to a bar, named El Farol, that offers entertainment on a certain night. Each agent goes if he 
expects fewer than 60 people to show up or stays home if he expects more than 60 to go. The 
choices are unaffected by the previous visits; there is no collusion or prior communication among 
agents; the only information available is the numbers who came in the past weeks. No agent knows 
the model on which other agents base their predictions. Arthur (1994) concluded that in this context 
there is no deductively rational solution based on the theoretical hypotheses of economics: if all 
believe few will go, all will go, invalidating this would invalidate that belief; similarly, if all believe 
most will go, nobody will go, invalidating that belief. In other terms, the “El Farol bar” problem 
provides an illustrative example of the process of rational decision between two alternatives of a 
group of rational agents with the presence of negative externalities. In this setting, there is no self-
fulfilling equilibrium and therefore in assuming fully rational use of the public information the 
system oscillates between states that is always frustrating for the agents. 
 
Despite this evidence, Arthur decided to use computer experiments for searching if an equilibrium 
emerges. In his experiments, 100 agents use randomly use on strategy among k strategies. If the 
strategy does not work, the agent drops it for the future, otherwise he keeps it. His computer 
experiments showed a possible Nash equilibrium: on average 40 percent forecast above 60, 60 
percent below 60. In other words, Arthur was able to show that a suboptimal (economic) 
equilibrium occurring at each time step around an a priori optimal allocation of the resource is 
reached by the system by hypothesizing a bounded rational inductive reasoning of the agents, but 
was not able to obtain a solution for such a situation “that is both evolutionary and complex” (1994, 
411). 
 
After demonstrating his economic equilibrium problem to economists, including economists 
specialized in game theory, Arthur had to admit that they did not know how to deal with it. He also 
noted that econophysicists found: 
 
“economists didn’t quite know what to make of [my paper]. My colleague at Santa Fe, Per 
Bak, (…) saw the manuscript and began to fax it to his physics friends. The physics 
community took it up, and in the hands of Challet, Marsili and Zhang, it inspired something 
different than I expected ‒the Minority Game. El Farol emphasized (for me) the difficulties 
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of formulating economic behavior in ill-defined problems. The Minority Game emphasizes 
something different: the efficiency of the solution” (Arthur 2004, Viii). 
 
In fact, Challet and Zhang (1997) formalized the “El Farol bar” by using a mathematical model 
developed by Caldarelli, Marsili and Zhang (1997) for studying the dynamics of financial market 
prices. This econophysic financial model draws also draws inspiration directly from the challenge 
Arthur addressed with the El Farol bar problem. Caldarelli et al. (1997, 479) observed that “from 
a physicist’s point of view, the market is an excellent example of self-organized systems: each 
agent decides according to his own perception of the events” and “the system reaches dynamically 
an equilibrium state characterized by fluctuations of any size, without the need of any parameter 
fine tuning or external driving”26. In other words, they were able to obtain a self-fulfilling 
equilibrium for the El Farol bar problem. To obtain such equilibrium, they introduced new 
hypotheses. Firstly, their reasoning is based on the typical financial economics equilibrium, the 
absence of arbitrage opportunity, which is not the typical economic market equilibrium. In this 
case, without new information, the price fluctuation dynamic should be stationary. Secondly, they 
analyze the El Farol Bar problem as an application of a Darwinist selection: at each time step, the 
agent with the smallest capital is eliminated and replaced by one with a new (random) strategy. 
From this perspective, the agents trade in a non-ending fight against each other in order to survive. 
Thirdly, they introduced the hypothesis of a power law to describe the distribution of the wealth of 
the traders. The numerical simulations of their model show close resemblance to the fluctuations 
of the Standard & Poor’s 500 index or to high frequency foreign exchange data. This result suggests 
that the stock market equilibrium is mainly due to the interaction among “speculators”, regardless 
of economic fundamentals. Moreover, and in accordance with Arthur’s problem, their model does 
not contain adaptive dynamics in the player’s strategies.  
 
Challet and Zhang (1997) kept the hypothesis of a Darwinist selection for solving the El Farol 
problem: “the poor players are regularly weeded out from the game and new players are introduced 
to replace the eliminated one” (1997, 415). In other words, some agents are discouraged and give 
up going to the El Farol bar in the future. To keep a certain diversity, they also introduce a mutation 
possibility in cloning. They also allow one of the strategies of the best player to be replaced by a 
new one. With these additional hypotheses, they observe that this population is capable of 
“learning”. The learning process is demonstrated by their simulations. Specifically, they show that 
if we increase the information available used by the agents (i.e. number of past results about the 
numbers who came in the past weeks), the volatility decreases, meaning that the agents make the 
right choice more often. Moreover, agents who use less information underperform compare to the 
agent who use more information. “Remarkable is that each player is by definition selfish, not 
considerate to fellow players, yet somehow they manage to better somewhat share the limited 
available resources” (Challet and Zhang 1997, 409). “The players manage to defy entropy, in other 
words to get themselves organised to occupy less unlikely configurations” (1997, 412).  
 
The Challet and Zhang (1997) and Caldarelli, Marsili and Zhang (1997) models use many key 
concepts of statistical physics, like entropy, power laws, “Self-organized criticality”, etc. The 
minority game is therefore a telling example how econophysics provides a solution to a problem 
that was originally conceived of in economics and was not tractable in terms of classic game theory 
with classic economic hypotheses. 
 
26 “Self-organized criticality” is another key econophysics’ concept (Jovanovic and Schinckus 2017, chap. 5) Self-
organized criticality is the property of dynamic systems that naturally self-organize into a critical point while obeying 
a power-law. 
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The minority game has another interesting feature. While it was created in order to analyze an 
economic problem, this model has been then applied back to physics and some related fields. It has 
been used for instance in radio engineering and computer science in order to improve wireless 
networks (Mähönen and Petrova 2008) or to improve coordination in wireless sensor networks 
(Galstyan, Krishnamachari, and Lerman 2004). In computer science, the minority game is used to 
improve the heterogeneous Delay Tolerant Networks (Sidi et al. 2013). According to Mähönen and 
Petrova (2008, 100), it could also be applied for studying the behaviors of flocks of birds. In other 
words, the minority game is an empty container that is applied to various phenomena totally 
independent of the economic phenomena in which it originated. It is worth noting that, in contrast 
to Van Der Pol or Le Corbeiller, Chalet and Zhang did not feel it necessary to give a list of possible 
applications. To us, this is due to the fact that creating mathematical models using a mathematical 
analogy is today a common practice. This observation is compatible with Claveau (2019): articles 
published in economics journals cited less and less articles published in mathematics journals, 
suggesting that mathematical models used by economists are more and more created within 
economics. 
 
III.2 Minority game: new form of mathematical analogies 
Our investigation shows that the minority game illustrates a noticeable change in the mathematical 
analogies. This mathematical model has been developed by borrowing simultaneously to 
economics and physics27. We noted that it integrates many key concepts of physics. However, it 
also integrates many key concepts of economics, such as the absence of arbitrage opportunity, 
rationality, cooperative games, and externalities. In other words, this mathematical model 
combines concepts and formalisms from economics and physics, which are both its source 
domains. In contrast, mathematical models saw in section II have only one source domain. 
However, they still have multiple target domains. 
 
In our opinion, the institutional position of econophysics provides important clues for this 
transformation. Econophysics has a singular institutional position: outside economics and in the 
shadow of physics (Gingras and Schinckus 2012, Jovanovic and Schinckus 2017, chap. 4). This 
position reflects an autonomy of the field and has created the opportunity for developing new 
hypotheses and models outside physics and economics (Jovanovic and Schinckus 2017). But it also 
reflects a shift in the use of the mathematical analogies. The mathematical models econophysicists 
have developed become more autonomous, and have permitted transfers to both economics and 
physics. In other terms, there is not one source domain anymore, but two source domains (i.e. 
physics and economics) for the mathematical model and several target domains. This result is 
compatible with some changes in econophysicists’ perspective. Today they defends a “mutual 
fertilization”28 between both disciplines rather than a unidirectional influence of physics on 
economics, as it was common in the past. This position is compatible with the evolution of the 
discipline, as Jovanovic and Schinckus (2013c, 2017) have pointed out: it is becoming increasingly 
a transdisciplinary one. To conclude, these new perspectives are in line with the progressive change 
we pointed out: from mechanical analogies –restricted to one source domain that concern 
mechanical phenomena– to mathematical analogies that make room for the kinds of two-way 
inferences between economics and physics (i.e. as an isomorphism), because the emphasis is on 
the reproduction of phenomena rather than the causal explanation. 
 
 
27 We detailed the example on the minority game. However, it is not the only one. For instance, physicists nowadays 
are using GARCH models (Modarres and Ouarda 2014). 
28 This expression is borrowed from Sornette (2014, 1). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
New relations between economics and physics are emerging. Our investigation has showed how 
“mathematical analogies” have changed, and how they have contributed to transforming the 
disciplinary boundaries between economics and physics. These boundaries were drawn before the 
20th century, while mathematical analogies emerged during the 20th century. As we have showed, 
the transformation of economics’ boundaries since the 1930s is directly concerned with the main 
characteristics of mathematical analogies. The latter are based on an autonomous mathematical 
structure that is fueled by concepts and formalisms that come from both disciplines. Our 
investigation does not pretend to be exhaustive, but it offers new perspectives on some of the 
evolutions of economics boundaries. 
 
REFERENCES 
Aoyama, Hideaki, Yoshi Fujiwara, Yuichi Ikeda, Hiroshi Iyetomi, Wataru Souma, and Hiroshi 
Yoshikawa. 2017. Macro-Econophysics: New Studies on Economic Networks and 
Synchronization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Armatte, Michel, and Amy Dahan Dalmedico. 2004. "Modèles et modélisations, 1950-2000 : 
Nouvelles pratiques, nouveaux enjeux / Models and modeling, 1950-2000 : New practices, 
new implications."  Revue d'histoire des sciences 57 (2):243-303. 
Arthur, W. Brian. 1994. "Complexity in economic theory: Inductive reasoning and bounded 
rationality."  American Economic Review 82 (2):406–411. 
Arthur, W. Brian. 2004. "Foreword to The Minority Game (book of Damien Challet, Matteo 
Marsili, and Yi-Cheng Zhang)." Working paper. 
Bartha, Paul. 2010. By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction and Evaluation of Analogical 
Arguments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bartha, Paul. 2019. "Analogy and Analogical Reasoning." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford 
University. 
Bjerkholt, Olav. 2015. "How it all began: the first Econometric Society meeting, Lausanne, 
September 1931."  European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 22 (6):1149-
1178. 
Bjerkholt, Olav, and Ariane Dupont-Kieffer, eds. 2009. Problems and Methods of Econometrics: 
The Poincare Lectures of Ragnar Frisch, 1933. London; New York: Routledge. 
Boumans, Marcel. 2004. How Economists Model the World into Numbers. London: Routledge. 
Caldarelli, Guido, Matteo Marsili, and Yi-Cheng Zhang. 1997. "A prototype model of stock 
exchange."  Europhysics Letters 40 (5):479-484. 
Cartwright, Nancy. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Challet, Damien, and Yi-Cheng Zhang. 1997. "Emergence of cooperation and organization in an 
evolutionary game."  Physica A 246 (3-4):407-418. 
Clauset, Aaron, Cosma Rohilla Shalizi, and Mark Newman. 2009. "Power-law distributions in 
empirical data."  SIAM Review 51 (4):661–703. 
Claveau, François. 2019. "Interdisciplinarity, Fragmentation and Economics: A Bibliometric 
Investigation." Charles Gide Workshops 2019, Montreal, June 26th 2019. 
Cournot, Antoine-Augustin. [1838] 1927. Mathematical principles of the theory of wealth. New 
York: Macmillan. 
Cournot, Antoine-Augustin. [1872] 1973. Considérations sur la Marche des Idées et des 
Évènements dans les Temps Modernes. Paris: Vrin. 
Frisch, Ragnar. 1933. "Propagation problems and impulse problems in dynamic economics." In 
Economic essays in honour of Gustav Cassel, 1-35. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Gabaix, Xavier. 2009. "Power Laws in Economics and Finance."  Annual Review of Economics 
1:255-293. 
- 18 - 
 
Galstyan, Aram, Bhaskar Krishnamachari, and Kristina Lerman. 2004. "Resource Allocation and 
Emergent Coordination in Wireless Sensor Networks." Workshop on Sensor Networks at 
the Nineteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, San Jose, California (USA). 
Gingras, Yves. 2015. "The Creative Power of Formal Analogies in Physics:The Case of Albert 
Einstein."  Science & Education 24 (5):529-541. 
Gingras, Yves, and Christophe Schinckus. 2012. "Institutionalization of Econophysics in the 
shadow of physics."  Journal of the History of Economic Thought 34 (1):109 - 130. 
Ginoux, Jean-Marc. 2017. History of nonlinear oscillations theory in France (1880-1940). Cham: 
Springer. 
Ginoux, Jean-Marc, Franck Jovanovic, and Philippe Le Gall. 2020. "The “rocking horse” and the 
theory of oscillations." Working paper. 
Goodwin, Richard M. 1951. "The nonlinear accelerator and the persistence of business cycles."  
Econometrica 19 (1):1–17. 
Goodwin, Richard M. 1990. Chaotic Economic Dynamics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Haavelmo, Trygve. 1944. "The Probability Approach in Econometrics."  Econometrica 12 
(Supplement):iii-vi+1-115. 
Hamburger, Ludwig. 1931. "Analogie des fluctuations économiques et des oscillations de 
relaxation."  Institut de Statistique de l’Université de Paris. Supplément aux Indices du 
Mouvement des Affaires Janvier:1-35. 
Hamburger, Ludwig. 1934. "Note on Economic Cycles and Relaxation-Oscillations."  
Econometrica 2 (1):112. 
Hesse, Marry. 1966. Models and Analogies in Science. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press. 
Hughes, Robert I. G. 1999. "The Ising model, computer simulation, and universal physics." In 
Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, edited by Mary S. 
Morgan and Margaret Morrison, 97-145. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Israel, Giorgio. 1996. La mathématisation du réel. Essai sur la modélisation mathématique. Paris: 
Le Seuil. 
Jovanovic, Franck, and Philippe Le Gall. 2001a. "Does God practice a random walk? The "financial 
physics" of a 19th century forerunner, Jules Regnault."  European Journal for the History 
of Economic Thought 8 (3):323-362. 
Jovanovic, Franck, and Philippe Le Gall. 2001b. "March to numbers: The statistical style of Lucien 
March." In History of Political Economy, annuel supplement: The Age of Economic 
Measurement, edited by Judy L. Klein and Mary S. Morgan, 86-100. 
Jovanovic, Franck, Rosario N. Mantegna, and Christophe Schinckus. 2019. "When Financial 
Economics influences Physics: The Role of Econophysics."  International Review of 
Financial Analysis 65. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2019.101378. 
Jovanovic, Franck, and Christophe Schinckus. 2013a. "Econophysics: A New Challenge for 
Financial Economics ?"  Journal of the History of Economic Thought 34 (3):319-352. 
Jovanovic, Franck, and Christophe Schinckus. 2013b. "The History of Econophysics’ Emergence: 
a New Approach in Modern Financial Theory."  History of Political Economy 45 (3):443-
474. 
Jovanovic, Franck, and Christophe Schinckus. 2013c. "Towards a transdisciplinary econophysics."  
Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (2):164-183. 
Jovanovic, Franck, and Christophe Schinckus. 2017. Econophysics and Financial Economics: An 
Emerging Dialogue. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Keynes, John Maynard. 1921. A Treatise on Probability. Londres: The MacMillan company. 
Kutner, Ryszard, Marcel Ausloos, Dariusz Grech, Tiziana Di Matteo, Christophe Schinckus, and 
H. Eugene Stanley. 2019. "Econophysics and sociophysics: Their milestones & 
challenges."  Physica A 516:240–253  
- 19 - 
 
Le Corbeiller, Philippe. 1933. "Les systèmes auto-entretenus et les oscillations de relaxation."  
Econometrica 1 (3):328-332. 
Le Gall, Philippe. 1994. "Histoire de l'Econométrie, 1914-1944. L'Erosion du 
Déterminisme."Doctoral dissertation, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. 
Le Gall, Philippe. 1999. "A World Ruled by Venus. On Henry L. Moore's Transfer of Periodogram 
Analysis from Physics to Economics."  History of Political Economy 31 (4):723-52. 
Le Gall, Philippe. 2002. "Les Représentations du Monde et les Pensées Analogiques des 
Economètres. Un Siècle de Modélisation en Perspective."  Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 
Humaines 6:39-64. 
Le Gall, Philippe. 2007. A history of econometrics in France. From Nature to Models. London: 
Routledge. 
Louça, Francisco. 2001. "Intriguing pendula: founding metaphors in the analysis of economic 
fluctuations."  Cambridge Journal of Economics 25:25–55. 
Louçã, Francisco. 2007. The years of high econometrics. A short history of the generation that 
reinvented economics. London: Routledge. 
Mähönen, Petri, and Marina Petrova. 2008. "Minority game for cognitive radios: Cooperating 
without cooperation."  Physical Communication 1:94–102. 
Ménard, Claude. 1978. La Formation d'une rationalité économique, A. A. Cournot. Paris: 
Flammarion. 
Ménard, Claude. 1989. "The Machine and the Heart."  Social Concept 4:81-95. 
Mirowski, Philip. 1989. More heat than light : economics as social physics, physics as nature's 
economics, Historical perspectives on modern economics. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mirowski, Philip , and Pamela Cook. 1990. "Walras’ “Economics and Mechanics”: Translation, 
Commentary, Context." In Economics As Discourse. An Analysis of the Language of 
Economists, edited by Warren J. Samuels, 189-224. New York: Springer. 
Modarres, Reza, and Taha B. M. J. Ouarda. 2014. "Modeling the relationship between climate 
oscillations and drought by a multivariate GARCH model."  Water Resources Research 50 
(1):601–618. 
Morgan, Mary S. 1990. The history of econometric ideas, Historical perspectives on modern 
economics. Cambridge (U.K.): Cambridge University Press. 
Morgan, Mary S. 1997. "Searching for Causal Relations in Economic Statistics: Reflections from 
History." In Causality in Crisis? Statistical Method and the Search for Causal Knowledge 
in the Social Sciences, edited by V.R. McKim and S.P. Turner. University of Notre Dame 
Press. 
Morgan, Mary S., and Margaret Morrison, eds. 1999. Models as mediators: perspectives on natural 
and social science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Norton, John D. 2018. The Material Theory of Induction. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh. 
Petitgirard, Loïc. 2004. "Le chaos : des questions théoriques aux enjeux sociaux. Philosophie, 
épistémologie, histoire et impact sur les institutions. (1880-2000)." Doctorate, Histoire. 
Spécialité : Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques, Université Lumière Lyon 2. 
Potters, Marc, and Jean-Philippe Bouchaud. 2003. "More statistical properties of stock order books 
and price impact."  Physica A 324:133–140. 
Schabas, Margaret. 1990. A world ruled by number : William Stanley Jevons and the rise of 
mathematical economics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Schinckus, Christophe. 2018. "Ising model, econophysics and analogies."  Physica A 508:95-103. 
Sidi, Habib B. A., Wissam Chahin, Rachid El-Azouzi, Francesco De Pellegrini, and Jean Walrand. 
2013. "Incentive Mechanisms based on Minority Game in Heterogeneous DTNs." Working 
paper. 
Signorini, Maria G., and Diego Di Bernardo. 1998. "Simulation of Heartbeat Dynamics: A 
Nonlinear Model."  International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 8 (8):1725–1731. 
- 20 - 
 
Sornette, Didier. 2014. "Physics and financial economics (1776-2014): puzzles, Ising and agent-
based models."  Reports on progress in physics 77 (6):062001-062028. 
Stanley, H. Eugene, Viktor Afanasyev, Luis A. Nunes Amaral, Serguey Buldyrev, Albert  
Goldberger, Steve  Havlin, Harry Leschhorn, Peter Mass, Rosario N.  Mantegna, Chung 
Kang Peng, Paul Prince, Andrew Salinger, and Karthik Viswanathan. 1996. "Anomalous 
fluctuations in the dynamics of complex systems: from DNA and physiology to 
econophysics."  Physica A 224 (1):302-321. 
Tonti, Enzo. 1972. "On the mathematical structure of a large class of physical theories."  Rendiconti 
della Classe di Scienze fisiche, mathematiche e naturali 52 (1):48-56. 
Tonti, Enzo. 1976. "The Reason for Analogies between Physical Theories."  Applied Mathematical 
Modelling 1 (1):37-50. 
Van Der Pol, Balthasar. 1930. "Oscillations sinusoïdales et de relaxation."  l’Onde électrique 
9:245-256 & 293-312. 
Van Der Pol, Balthasar. 1940. "Biological Rhythms Considered as Relaxation Oscillations."  
Journal of Internal Medicine 103 (S108):76-88. 
Van Der Pol, Balthasar, and J. Van der Mark. 1928. "The heartbeat considered as a relaxation 
oscillation, and an electrical model of the heart."  The London Edinburgh and Dublin 
Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science 6 (July-December):763-775. 
Walras, Léon. 1909. "Economique et mécanique."  Bulletin de la Société Vaudoise de Sciences 
Naturelles 45:313-325. 
Weintraub, E. Roy. 1985. General Equilibrium Analysis: Studies in Appraisal. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Weintraub, E. Roy. 2002. How Economics Became a Mathematical Science. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Zambelli, Stefano. 2007. "A Rocking Horse That Never Rocked: Frischʼs “Propagation Problems 
and Impulse Problems”."  History of Political Economy 39 (145-166). 
 
